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“Let wealth come in by comely thrift, And not by any sordid 
shift; ‘Tis haste Makes waste; Extremes still have their fault. 
Who gripes too hard the dry and slipp’ry sand, Holds none at 
all, or little, in his hand.”1   
I. Introduction 
The excerpt from Robert Herrick’s poem, “Connubii Flores, or The 
Wellwishers at Weddings” was written as advice given from the chorus of 
old men to the newlyweds on their wedding day, but perhaps it could be 
taken as sound business advice for those in the oil and gas industry as well.  
Horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, for all practical purposes, 
have been synonymous in the United States’ rise to becoming one of the 
world’s leaders in oil and gas production. Horizontal drilling provides for 
greater production than wells drilled vertically because it allows operators 
to access more of the wellbore in the production zone. Perhaps even more 
important, hydraulic fracturing provides a method to increase the 
production exponentially by allowing for oil and gas extraction from tight 
formations that were at one time thought impossible. While the industry has 
expanded and prospered greatly during this innovative era, it has also had 
the unintended effect of contributing to a considerable drop in oil and gas 
prices. But, with any boom and bust, the result is often a reorganization of 
operational strategies aimed at becoming more efficient and streamlined to 
sustain the bust, while preparing for the next boom.  
                                                                                                                 
 1. Robert Herrick, HESPERIDES: OR, THE WORKS BOTH HUMANE & DIVINE (1648).  
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Even so, being more efficient in certain areas can sometimes have its 
downside too. Recently, operators have turned their efficiency focus 
towards frac sand. Traditionally, operators have obtained frac sand from the 
Northern Midwest, where the highest quality and best-suited sand is 
located. Transportation and logistics, however, can account for as much as 
two-thirds of the cost because the sand must often travel thousands of miles 
to reach where it is needed. Mindful, operators have started looking for 
cheaper alternatives closer to their operations due to the climate of the 
market. One thing operators have perhaps not considered are the 
implications for the lessor and his interests that arise from the implied 
covenants of the oil and gas lease.   
This comment argues that the development of new sources of frac sand 
in the United States, while economically beneficial to operators, 
nonetheless inferior in quality, might lead to litigation between lessors and 
lessees over obligations arising from the development and protection of the 
lease. Part II introduces the history and method of hydraulic fracturing, the 
value of frac sand to the process, and discusses new developments in the 
frac sand needed to carry out these operations. Part III outlines the 
obligations that arise through implied covenants in oil and gas leases, 
discusses the standard of performance for such obligations, and compares 
how oil and gas states’ case law and statutes recognize these implied 
covenants. Part IV discusses the potential for new litigation that could arise 
from hydraulic fracturing operations when an operator chooses to use sand 
from an in-basin sand mine and examines three hypothetical situations that 
could arise.   
II. Hydraulic Fracturing  
A. The History and Evolution of Fracing 
Hydraulic fracturing has revolutionized oil and gas production in the 
United States by making it both accessible and financially feasible. The 
process of hydraulic fracturing, however, is not new to the oil and gas 
industry. Despite its recent prevalence, hydraulic fracturing technology has 
been used to stimulate the production of oil and gas wells for almost 
seventy years.
2
 The continued improvement of hydraulic fracturing 
technology has allowed for the development of several unconventional 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See A Historic Perspective, FRACFOCUS, https://fracfocus.org/hyraulic-fracturing-
how-it-works/history-hydraulic-fracturing (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) (noting that hydraulic 
fracturing was first used in the United States during the late 1940s).  
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reservoirs, in particularly tight-shale formations.
3
 In fact, nearly eighty 
percent of production from these unconventional formations would be 
virtually impossible if not for hydraulic fracturing.
4
 Producers have used 
hydraulic fracturing in the completion of over one million producing wells, 
with an estimated 35,000 wells fractured each year.
5
 Oil produced from 
wells that are fractured account for more than half of all production of oil in 
the United States, with output nearly doubling over the past decade.
6
 The 
advent of horizontal drilling combined with hydraulic fracturing makes the 
production from tight shale formations economical; consequently, the 
United States has become one of the leading producers of oil and natural 
gas in the world.
7
  
B. What is Hydraulic Fracturing 
Once a well reaches “TD”—total depth for drilling—production casing 
is set, through the use of cement, in the producing formation. Alternatively, 
operators may plan for an open-hole production, in which, no casing is set 
because production will come directly from the formation.  After the 
drilling operations have left the location, a “fracing” crew will move on and 
prepare to start hydraulic fracturing of the production formation. If a 
production string is set, perforations are made in the casing that allows for 
the flow of fracing fluid and eventual production. Though the process is 
essentially the same for each well, the design will depend on the conditions 
and formation of each well.
8
  
Hydraulic fracturing is a multi-stage process that pumps large volumes 
of fracturing fluid downhole under high pressure to create and enhance the 
natural fractures in the production formation.
9
 The fluid used in hydraulic 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Id.  
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Matt Egan, Oil Milestone: Fracking Fuels Half of U.S. Output, CNN MONEY, (Mar. 
24, 2016, 12:40 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/24/investing/fracking-shale-oil-
boom/index.html.   
 7. See Robert Rapier, How the Shale Boom Turned the World Upside Down, FORBES, 
(Apr. 21, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2017/04/21/how-the-shale-
boom-turned-the-world-upside-down/#5711c39877d2.  
 8. See Hydraulic Fracturing: The Process, FRACFOCUS, https://fracfocus.org/ 
hydraulic-fracturing-how-it-works/hydraulic-fracturing-process (last visited Oct. 18, 2017) 
(“[W]hile the process remains essentially the same, the sequence may change depending 
upon unique local conditions.”).  
 9. Id. 
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fracturing consists mostly of a mixture of water and sand.
10
 Water carries 
the sand, a proppant, into the open fractures; the sand will “prop” or keep 
open the fractures after pressure is reduced in the wellbore.
11
  This 
stimulates production of the well by “creat[ing] paths that increase the rate 
at which fluids can be produced from the reservoir formations, in some 
cases by many hundreds of percent.”12 Because hydrocarbons would remain 
trapped within in the formation with no way out, hydraulic fracturing is 
essential to production in these formations.  
C. The Importance of Frac Sand  
Given the significance of hydraulic fracturing to the oil and gas industry, 
one can easily conceive that the demand for sand used in this process has 
grown exponentially. Some estimates show that total sand production in the 
United States has quadrupled since 2014, with the oil and gas industry share 
accounting for twenty-five percent in 2014 and more than seventy percent 
in 2015.
13
 “A hydraulic fracturing job on one well can require a few 
thousand tons of sand.”14 What may be less apparent is the importance of 
the type of sand used in the hydraulic fracturing process. “Frac sand” must 
meet very demanding industry specifications because it remains in the 
fractures, to help keep them propped open after the hydraulic fracturing 
process is complete.
15
 Frac sand standards are determined by the American 
Petroleum Institute (“API”) and the International Organization for 
Standards (“ISO”).16 The API/ISO standards criteria include among others: 
high silica content, homogenous grain size, high sphericity and roundness, 
and high crush resistance.
17
 High silica content (95–99 %) is indicative of 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Id. (“Water and sand make up 98 to 99.5 percent of the fluid used in hydraulic 
fracturing.”). 
 11. Id.   
 12. Id. 
 13. North American FracSand Consumption Will Grow with Drastic Shift in End Users, 
UNIV. OF TEXAS BUREAU OF ECONOMIC GEOLOGY’S ECONOMIC MINERALS PROGRAM (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2017), http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/thinkcorner/CEE_Snapshot-
Frac_Sands-Jan17.pdf. 
 14. What is Frac Sand?, GEOLOGY.COM, http://geology.com/articles/frac-sand/ (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2007) (“Between 2005 and 2015, the amount of frac sand used by the oil and 
gas industry had increased dramatically.”).  
 15. See id.  
 16. See Benson, M.E., and Wilson, A.B., Frac Sand in the United States—A Geological 
and Industry Overview, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OPEN-FILE REPORT 2015–1107 at 2 
(2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.3133/ofr20151107.  
 17. Id. at 2–6.  
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the sand used as frac sand, with the most premium being ninety-nine 
percent or greater silica.
18
 Homogenous grain size is important in frac sand 
to allow for permeability.
19
 “The greater roundness [and] sphericity 
provides better porosity [and] permeability between grains, allowing better 
flow of oil and gas from the fractures to the wellhead.”20 Another important 
factor of frac sand is the crush resistance necessary to hold open the 
fractures in the formation; the higher the percentage of silica in the sand, 
the higher its crush resistance.
21
  
The highest-quality frac sand, designated as Tier One, is predominately 
found in the upper Midwest of the United States, and is referred to as 
“Ottawa” or “Northern White” sand.22 The API/ISO standards for frac sand 
are modeled after the properties of Ottawa/Northern White sands.
23
 As the 
need for hydraulic fracturing in the oil industry continues to grow, so too 
will the need for frac sand—primarily Tier One. The amount of sand being 
used per well in the industry has, on average, increased by fifty percent on a 
year to year basis.
24
 With this increase in consumption, the challenge 
becomes supply and logistics. For example, where it once took twenty 
railcar loads of sand to fracture one well, it now takes seventy-five loads; 
“that means that each frac job has gone from consuming 4 million pounds 
to 15 million pounds of sand.”25 Interestingly, the cost of Tier One sand 
itself is only about half the cost to operators, or in some cases less; 
transportation costs and logistics can account for as much as two-thirds of 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Id. at 5.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 6.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 53. (“In 2014, approximately 70 percent of the silica sand used for proppant 
was mined in the Great Lakes Region, which included Illinois, Minnesota, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin. Wisconsin and, to a lesser extent, Illinois and Minnesota are the primary 
producers of the Nation’s highest quality frac sand. Wisconsin accounts for nearly one-half 
of all the frac sand capacity in the United States owing to its premium sand deposits, railway 
infrastructure, and long-term presence in the industry.”); see also Taso Melisaris, Not All 
Frac Sand is Created Equal, FAIRMOUNTSANTROL, http://fairmountsantrol.com/blog/oil-
gas/well-challenges/not-frac-sand-created-equal/ (Oct. 11, 2016) (noting that northern white 
sand is premium Tier 1); Keith Schaefer, The Big Opportunity in US Energy Right Now—
and Why, OIL AND GAS INVESTMENTS BULLETIN, https://oilandgas-investments.com/2015/oil-
and-gas-financial/the-big-opportunity-in-us-energy-right-now-and-why/ (Apr. 28, 2015) 
(“Wisconsin—a northern state that borders Lake Superior—holds almost all the Tier 1 frac 
sand in the USA.”).  
 23. Id. at 2.  
 24. Schaefer, supra note 22. 
 25. Id.  
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the end cost.
26
 This adds huge costs to get Tier One sands to tight shale 
plays in areas such as Texas and Oklahoma. “Depending on the modes of 
transport, distances traveled, and number of transfer points, the cost of 
white silica frac sand proppant may reach $170 per ton by the time it arrives 
at the well site.”27 Down turn in oil market prices and the need to control 
cost for profit margins, have led many operators to look for frac sand closer 
to home.
28
  
D. Shift Towards In-basin Frac Sand 
The decline in oil prices have made operators contemplate different areas 
where they can reduce costs. Until a few years ago, Northern White frac 
sand was the “industry standard” used in 100% of wells that were hydraulic 
fractured.
29
 Now, Northern White only accounts for about two-thirds of the 
frac sand used in the United States.
30
 In Texas, the Permian Basin alone is 
expected to double its share of frac sand consumption by the year 2020.
31
 
With this in mind, several new sand mining operations have recently started 
development in Texas and surrounding areas.
32
 These new “in-basin” mines 
are different from the “Brown sand” typically associated with Texas 
because the “[f]rac sand produced from the in-basin mines is sourced from 
sand dunes rather than from formations beneath the Earth’s surface that 
require mining.”33 Estimations show that these new mines could provide as 
much as forty-five million tons of sand each year, with transportation costs 
being much lower because of the proximity to where the hydraulic 
fracturing jobs take place.
34
 In comparison, Northern White sand would 
have to travel almost ten times the distance as sand mined in Texas; with 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Id.  
 27. Benson, supra note 16.  
 28. Schaefer, supra note 22. 
 29. See Hana Askren, Texas Frac Sand in Demand, FORBES, (Sept. 14, 2017, 1:41 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mergermarket/2017/09/14/texas-frac-sand-in-
demand/#41ae6f7e469e.  
 30. Id.  
 31. North American FracSand Consumption Will Grow, supra note 13.  
 32. Askren, supra note 29 (noting that tens of new mines are starting up in Texas and 
surrounding states.); see also Rich Kremer, Texas Frac Sand Boom May Hurt Wisconsin 
Mines, WISCONSIN PUBLIC RADIO, (July 30, 2017, 4:14 PM), https://wpr.org/print/texas-frac-
sand-boom-may-hurt-wisconsin-mines.  
 33. Thomas Parambil Jacob, How the Brown Sand Bonanza Impacts US Shale Plays, 
IHS MARKIT, (Aug. 17, 2017), https://ihsmarkit.com/research-analysis/how-brown-sand-
supply-impacts-us-shale-plays.html.  
 34. Kremer, supra note 32.  
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cost of transportation potentially exceeding $100 per ton versus $20–$50 
per ton for Texas sand.
35
  
One potential drawback, however, is the quality of the sand produced. 
“Wisconsin frac sand has an advantage over sand from Texas and other 
states because it is exceptionally round and hard, which makes it better at 
unlocking oil from deeper deposits of rock.”36 One of the major differences 
between Texas’ Brown sand and Northern White is the compressive 
strength, also known as “crush strength.” Brown sand has a lower 
compressive strength of 4,000 to 8,000 psi, compared with Northern White 
which has a compressive strength of over 8,000 psi.
37
 In other words, 
Brown sand is more suitable for shallow wells and formations that have low 
fracture closure stress, while Northern White sand can withstand deeper 
wells and formations with higher stresses. “[Northern White] sand actually 
does a better job in the long run, but right now cheaper costs are the most 
important factors for producers.”38 Furthermore, several risk factors exist 
because “new in-basin sand is very different than northern white and other 
brown sands”39 and there is “very little data to quantify the effect of usage 
of in-basin sands on well productivity, estimated ultimate recovery[,] and 
initial production rates.”40    
III. Implied Covenants of Oil and Gas 
A. The Oil and Gas Lease 
Lessors and lessees enter into oil and gas leases with the purpose of 
exploring, developing, and operating the premises to their mutual benefit. 
Lessors prefer more encompassing provisions, while lessors would prefer 
less. Because lessors and lessees cannot anticipate every possible situation 
that will arise under the terms of the lease, courts have created legal rights 
                                                                                                                 
 35. North American FracSand Consumption Will Grow, supra note 13.   
 36. Id.; see also Jordan Blum, Texas Frac Sand Mines Keep Opening, but Halliburton 
Says Usage Slows, HOUSTON CHRONICAL (July 25, 2017, 2:12 PM), 
http://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Texas-frac-sand-mines-keep-opening-but-
11368797.php. 
 37. North American FracSand Consumption Will Grow, supra note 13. 
 38. Keith Schaefer, The #1 Efficiency Gains in Energy Come From . . . Sand?, OIL AND 
GAS INVESTMENTS BULLETIN, (Aug. 10, 2016), https://oilandgas-investments.com/ 
2016/stock-market/the-1-efficiency-gains-in-energy-come-fromsand/. 
 39. Tim Beims & Colter Cookson, Permian Driving Frac Sand Supply Shift, THE 
AMERICAN OIL & GAS REPORTER, (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.aogr.com/magazine/frac-
facts/permian-driving-frac-sand-supply-shift. 
 40. Jacob, supra note 33.  
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called implied covenants that are inferred from the agreement between the 
two parties when the lease remains silent.
41
 There are six major oil and gas 
implied covenants:  
(1) the implied duty to develop; (2) the implied duty to explore, 
including a duty of further exploration in some states; (3) the 
implied duty to protect against drainage; (4) the implied duty to 
market, including the “marketable-product” rule with its effect 
upon who bears marketability costs; (5) the implied duty to 
accommodate; and (6) the implied duty of prudent operation for 
the mutual benefit of the lessor and lessee.
42
 
For the purposes of this Article, the implied duty to develop, the implied 
duty to protect against drainage, and the implied duty of prudent operation 
for the mutual benefit of the lessor and lessee will be the main focus.  
B. The Reasonably Prudent Operator Standard  
Implied covenants have been created by courts because leases do not 
expressly define every duty or standard of a lessee. Most jurisdictions 
follow the reasonably prudent operator standard to govern the duties of a 
lessee under the lease. The reasonably prudent operator standard requires 
“[w]hatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably expected of 
operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the interests of both lessor 
and lessee, is what is required.”43 The reasonably prudent operator standard 
has the same purpose in oil and gas law as does the reasonable man 
standard in negligence law:  
This analogy to the reasonable man of tort law also helps to 
explain the meaning of the prudent-operator standard. The 
prudent operator is a reasonable man engaged in oil and gas 
operations. He is a hypothetical oil operator who does what he 
ought to do not what he ought not to do with respect to 
operations on the leasehold. Since the standard of conduct is 
objective, a defendant cannot justify his act or omission on 
personal grounds or by reference to his peculiar circum-
                                                                                                                 
 41. Kenneth M. Klemm, Implied Covenants: Recent Developments in Failure-to-
Develop Cases and Other Implied Obligations Under Mineral Leases, 57 ROCKY MT. MIN. 
L. INST. 20-1, 3-4 (2011). 
 42. John Burritt McArthur, U.S. Oil and Gas Implied Covenants and Their Functions: 
“As Much a Part of the Contract—Is as Effectually One of Its Terms—As if Had Been 
Plainly Expressed,” 61 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 29-1, 7 (2015). 
 43. Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th Cir. 1905).  
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stances. . . . In short, the question is not what was meet and 
proper for this defendant to do, given his peculiar circumstances, 
but what a hypothetical operator acting reasonably would have 
done, given circumstances generally obtained in the locality.
44
 
C. Implied Duty to Develop  
It is easy to understand why a lessor and lessee have a common interest 
in the development of an oil and gas lease. Both stand to profit from the 
development if successful. Their interests, however, are not always as 
common as one might think. For the lessor, more wells mean more money 
because they do not have to share in the expenses of drilling the wells. On 
the other hand, the lessee may have several reasons for delaying or deciding 
not to develop further. Shortage of capital, scarcity of resources, 
development of other leases, and belief that further development would not 
be financially beneficial are just a few of the reasons a lessee might have 
for not developing the lease. Thus, while a lessor has motivation to seek 
more development, the lessee’s interests in development might not always 
be paramount.  
One of the leading implied covenant cases, Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc 
Co.,
45
 involved a development dispute between lessor and lessee after the 
express terms of the lease had been satisfied. The lease required that a well 
be drilled within the five-year primary term to avoid termination.
46
 Lanyon 
Zinc drilled a well in the fifth year of the lease, satisfying the express terms 
of the lease.
47
 Lanyon Zinc made no other efforts to develop the lease after 
completion of the first well, though other companies successfully drilled 
adjacent to the Brewster lease. Brewster notified Lanyon Zinc in writing to 
declare that the lease terminated and demanded surrender. After the demand 
was not complied with, Brewster sued.
48
 Though Lanyon Zinc had satisfied 
the expressed terms of the lease, avoiding the lease termination, the Eight 
Circuit framed the question to be considered as:  
The implication necessarily arising from these provisions—the 
intention which they obviously reflect—is that if, at the end of 
the five-year period prescribed for original exploration and 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Johnson v. Hamill, 392 N.W.2d 55, 58 (N.D. 1986) (quoting 5 H. Williams & C. 
Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 806.3, p. 42 (1985)).  
 45. 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905). 
 46. Id. at 810.  
 47. Id. at 815.  
 48. Id.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/5
2018] Frac Sand, Hydraulic Fracturing & Implied Covenants 1405 
 
 
development, oil and gas, one or both, had been found to exist in 
the demised premises in paying quantities, the work of 
exploration, development, and production should proceed with 
reasonable diligence for the common benefit of the parties, or the 
premises be surrendered to the lessor.
49
  
The court reasoned that absent express language in the lease, further work 
should be left to an implication of the reasonably calculated intentions of 
the parties as manifested in the lease, which was the production of oil and 
gas to their mutual benefit.
50
 Furthermore, the contract did not stipulate that 
if Lanyon Zinc found oil and gas in paying quantities, they must engage in 
operation; but the agreement to pay royalties to Brewster implied that the 
parties intended for Lanyon Zinc to operate the well.
51
 In other words, 
“[w]hatever is necessary to the accomplishment of that which is expressly 
contracted to be done is part and parcel of the contract, though not 
specified.”52 Thus, the court held that the lease contained an implied 
covenant to continue exploration, development, and production with 
reasonable diligence after the primary term of the lease had expired.
53
  
A lessee’s duty to develop is an objective standard. Reasonable 
expectations are not based solely on the subjective view of the lessee only, 
or on the lessor only.
54
 Therefore, a lessee only has a duty to develop if the 
lessor proves that it would likely be profitable to develop. A lessee’s duties, 
however, do not “carry the operations beyond the point where they will be 
profitable to him, even if some benefit to the lessor will result from them.”55 
Thus, a lessor cannot expect a lessee to conduct operations when the 
expense would outweigh the profit, even if the lessor would benefit.  
D. Development Through Operations Other Than Drilling 
Compliance with the implied duty to develop is not limited to drilling. 
Operators have many ways of enhancing production that have advanced as 
the oil and gas industry has evolved. Taking into account Brewster, the 
explanation of the reasonably prudent operator’s duty to develop can 
encompass development activities other than drilling. Indeed, several courts 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 810. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 813–14. 
 55. Id. at 814. 
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have dealt with duties to develop that arise out of activities other than 
drilling.
56
 In one case, a court held that failure to fracture a well was a 
breach of the implied covenant to develop. In Crocker v. Humble Oil & 
Refining Co.,
57
 lessors brought an action for cancellation of an oil and gas 
lease after demand of additional drilling within sixty days was not met. The 
original lease had been divided into two parts by Humble, with wells drilled 
on both. But, over thirty-seven years had passed since a well had been 
drilled on the lease.
58
 Humble contended that the delay was prudent and 
proper because they were in negotiations to create a waterflood unit on one 
part of the lease, and the drilling of an additional well would interfere with 
those negotiations.
59
 Looking at whether the delay was prudent and proper 
in light of the circumstances, the court found that delay of development of 
the portion of the lease that included the waterflood unit was reasonably 
prudent.
60
 The court explained, however, that “the standard of prudent 
operations to which a defendant should be held responsible is determined 
by the skills and knowledge then available.”61 During the years in which 
development was delayed, sandfracing had been discovered and 
commercially introduced; moreover, Humble and others had used 
sandfracing in the area.
62
 Evidence indicated that a well drilled on the other 
portion of the lease with the use of sandfracing would probably be 
profitable.
63
 As such, the court found that Humble had not acted as a 
reasonable prudent operator in delaying development of the portion of the 
lease not included in the waterflood program.
64
 
In another duty to develop case, Waseco Chemical & Supply v. Bayou 
State Oil,
65
 the court held that failure to employ known successful recovery 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See e.g., Clifton v. Kuntz, 325 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. 1959) (discussing that operator 
could have been liable for unreasonable failure to rework the well had duty been breached); 
Wadkins v. Wilson Oil Co., 6 So. 2d 720, 721 (La. 1942) (explaining that the operator was 
in breach for not developing wells “in accordance with the new and successful methods of 
development used by others in this . . . oil field.”); Myers v. Shell, 110 P.2d 810 (Kan. 1941) 
(discussing whether there was an implied duty to deepen a gas well into a gas and oil well, 
but holding that plaintiff had not met its burden of proof showing that a prudent operator 
would have done so).  
 57. 419 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1965).  
 58. Id. at 271.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 272–73. 
 61. Id. at 272.  
 62. Id. at 271. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 274.  
 65. 371 So. 2d 305 (La. App. 1979).  
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methods amounted to a failure to prudently operate and develop lease as a 
reasonably prudent operator would have. Bayou State Oil acquired the lease 
which contained about fifty existing wells.
66
 In the following twenty-four 
years, Bayou State Oil drilled no additional wells on the lease.
67
 During that 
time, lessees on adjacent properties employed a secondary recovery 
technique called fireflooding.
68
 The fireflooding method successfully 
produced about sixty percent of the oil in place, while the method used by 
Bayou State Oil only produced about five percent.
69
 Additionally, the 
royalties from the fireflood technique amounted to $1200 per acre per 
month versus less than $3 per acre per month under the method employed 
by Bayou State Oil.
70
 Based upon the circumstances, the court found that 
Bayou State Oil “failed in its obligation of diligent development [as a 
reasonably prudent operator] of the Scanland lease for the benefit of itself 
and lessors.”71  
Lessees must be mindful that the implied covenant of duty to develop is 
not solely limited to drilling additional wells. The duty may apply to 
enhanced recovery methods, horizontal drilling, reworking, and other 
activities as much as it does to drilling. It must be pointed out, however, 
that the facts must still show that a reasonably prudent operator would 
choose to develop under similar circumstances, while also considering 
profitability. Lessors cannot demand development because it would be 
profitable to them, the development must reasonably be to the mutual 
benefit of both the lessor and lessee.   
E. Implied Duty to Protect Against Drainage 
Oil and gas reservoirs are not perfectly located within property lines. 
Because oil and gas are fluid in nature, flow to different areas in the 
reservoir often crosses property lines. Consequently, the oil and gas 
industry was shaped by the “rule of capture,”72 under which one who brings 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Id. at 311. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 311–12. 
 69. Id. at 312.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 307. 
 72. 5 Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW 
§ 822.3 (2017) (“In short, under the Rule of Capture, a landowner has title to the oil and gas 
he produces from his land, wherever the mineral may have been located originally. It is 
immaterial that some of the oil or gas now in place may have come from the land of others; 
the mineral is now subject to the physical control of the lessee and legally will be the 
property of the lessee and lessor when produced.”).  
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oil and gas to the surface is said to have captured and now owns the severed 
product. As a result, a well on an adjacent property can legally drain oil and 
gas from a neighboring property, as long as, the drainage is through 
underground migration that is then produced within the property lines of the 
adjoining well. Thus, drainage has the potential to deprive both the lessor 
and lessee of economic benefits. As a result, courts have imposed the duty 
to protect against drainage upon lessees before oil and gas migrates to a 
neighboring well.  
A lessee’s duty to protect against drainage requires the lessee to drill an 
offset well or protect the leased premises from a well drilled on neighboring 
property.
73
 Like a lessee’s duty to develop, courts employ the prudent 
operator standard in determining if the lessee has breached the implied duty 
to protect against drainage, by failing to drill an offset well. Furthermore, 
one of the key factors in the determination of whether a lessee acted as a 
prudent operator in protecting against drainage is profitability.
74
 In other 
words, would a prudent operator drill an offset well to protect against 
drainage if doing so would be profitable, but not drill the offset well if it 
would be unprofitable. 
To establish a breach of the implied duty to protect against drainage, the 
lessor must prove: “(1) that substantial drainage has taken place on the 
leasehold; and (2) that an offset well would produce oil and gas in paying 
quantities, i.e. in sufficient quantities to repay the cost of drilling, 
equipping, and operating the well and to return a profit on the 
investment.”75 Occasionally courts have suggested that substantial drainage 
and production in paying quantities are interchangeable; meaning that there 
is not substantial drainage unless there is enough oil and gas in place to 
recoup the costs of operation and drilling with additional profit.
76
 However, 
courts that treat substantial drainage as an independent requirement are 
justified in doing so because a lessor who proves that an additional well 
would be profitable, but fails to prove substantial drainage, has merely 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See, e.g., Thoroughbred Assns., L.L.C. v. Kan. City Royalty Co., L.L.C., 248 P.3d 
758, 771 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011); Sundheim v. Reef Oil Corp., 806 P.2d 503, 508 (Mont. 
1991); Williams v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 432 F.2d 165, 171 (5th Cir. 1970); Indian 
Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rosamond, 120 P.2d 349, 352 (Okla. 1941). 
 74. See, e.g., Olsen v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 212 F. Supp. 332, 333 (D. Wyo. 1963); 
Rosamand, 120 P.2d at 352; Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. 
1981) (citing Clifton v. Koontz, 325 S.W.2d 684, 695–96 (Tex. 1959)). 
 75. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 72, § 822.  
 76. Id. § 822.1; Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Andreae, 245 Miss. 11, 147 So. 2d 116 
(1962); Shell Oil Co. v. James, 257 So. 2d 488 (Miss. 1971). 
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proven that oil and gas exists in profitable quantities not that there has been 
a permanent loss of oil and gas.
77
 The second element of proof, that an 
offset well will produce in paying quantities, is distinguishable from the 
meaning given in the habendum clause of an oil and gas lease. In relation to 
the implied duty to protect against drainage, production in paying quantities 
means: “such quantities as would lead a reasonably prudent operator to drill 
the additional or off-set well with the expectation of recovering from 
production the cost of drilling, equipping, and operating the well plus a 
reasonable profit.”78  Thus, to establish a breach of implied duty to protect 
against drainage, the lessor must establish that there is drainage from the 
leased property, that the drainage is substantial, and that an offset well 
would recover the cost and make a profit.   
Another situation that arises in implied duty to protect against drainage 
cases results when drainage is to a well drilled by the lessee on property of 
another lessor, sometimes referred to as “fraudulent drainage.” There are 
three general categories of these types of cases: (1) decisions reciting the 
fact that the lessee caused the drainage, but because a prudent operator 
would not have drilled to prevent drainage, recovery was denied; (2) cases 
where the lessee has caused the drainage, but does not change the common 
rules of liability for failure to protect against drainage; and (3) cases where 
the lessee’s liability has been increased when they are the cause of drainage 
on the leased property.
79
 Some courts have even held the lessee liable 
without proof that an offset well would have been profitable. In Geary v. 
Adams Oil and Gas Co.,
80
 the court found against lessee base upon a theory 
of unjust enrichment: 
But here the mind is haunted by the fact that the defendant is the 
beneficiary of the oil drained from plaintiff’s land by the wells 
on the north and the south which belong to the defendant. It has 
not only been saved the cost of drilling, equipping, and operating 
a protecting well but it gets the oil anyway without plaintiffs 
being paid for it.
81
 
Some scholars, however, oppose the idea that a lessee should be held liable 
for drainage to another of the lessee’s wells without proof that an offset 
                                                                                                                 
 77. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 72, § 822.1 
 78. Id. § 822.1; Whitaker v. Texaco, 283 F.2d 169, 175–76 (5th Cir. 1960).  
 79. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 72, § 824. 
 80. 31 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Ill. 1940).  
 81. Id. at 834.  
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well would be profitable.
82
 They suggest that the law should require no 
more of the lessee than what a reasonably prudent operator would do if he 
did not hold the adjoining lease.
83
 Furthermore, these scholars suggest that 
only procedural changes are needed to place the burden of proof on the 
defendant in showing that there is not production in paying quantities, for 
which the lessee is usually more well informed.
84
  
Courts enforced the implied duty to protect against drainage in a number 
of ways: (1) cancellation of the lease; (2) conditional cancellation of the 
lease; (3) cancellation combined with damages; (4) injunction to drill offset 
well; and (5) damages for past and future loss.
85
 There are several cases, 
however, which hold that cancellation of the lease is not available, and that 
the only remedy is damages.
86
 Because the duty to protect against drainage 
is an ongoing duty, the statute of limitations will not bar an action brought 
too late after the cause first occurred.
87
 Although, in such a case, the 
damages will be limited to those that occurred during the statutory limit 
beginning just before the action is filed.
88
 
F. Implied Duty of Prudent Operation 
The implied duty of prudent operation for the mutual benefit of the lessor 
and lessee is a catchall duty that covers those duties that do not fall within 
the more recognized or specific implied covenants.
89
 It is viewed as an 
expression of the more general duty of the lessee to perform in such a 
manner as to achieve the purposes of the agreement in the oil and gas 
lease.
90
 There are four general categories of disputes that fall within the 
implied duty of prudent operation:  
(1) claims by lessors that operations on the land have been 
carelessly conducted causing damage to the royalty interests; (2) 
claims by the lessor that premature abandonment of the lease has 
damaged royalty interest; (3) claims by the lessor that lessee has 
failed to maximize the recovery from the land by using advanced 
production techniques; and (4) claims by the lessor that the lease 
                                                                                                                 
 82. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 72, § 824.2.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. § 825.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Rosamond, 120 P.2d 349. 
 89. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 72, § 861.  
 90. Id.   
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failed to seek favorable action by the regulatory commission that 
would have benefited the royalty interest.
91
  
Some courts, however, may recognize a lessor’s claim against the lessee for 
failure to maximize recovery from the land by using advanced production 
techniques, as a duty to develop through operations other than drilling.
92
  
G. State Laws Regarding the Implied Covenants   
1. Texas  
Texas courts view implied covenants to particular disputes under three 
broad categories of implied covenants: (1) development of the premises, (2) 
protection of the leasehold, and (3) management and administration of the 
lease.
93
  Texas applies prudent operator standard to govern implied duties 
that exist between lessors and lessees. “The standard of care in testing the 
performance of implied covenants by lessees is that of a reasonably prudent 
operator under the same or similar facts and circumstances.”94 In failure-to-
develop cases, profitability plays an important role, as the critical question 
is often whether the lessor can prove a reasonable expectation of profit to 
the lessor and lessee.
95
  Thus, there is an obligation to develop a lease in 
Texas, but it does not require the lessee to continue development if the 
lessee can prove that further development would not be profitable.  
In Texas, while a breach of a condition of the lease results in termination 
of the lease, breach of an implied covenant does not automatically result in 
termination.
96
 Courts generally prefer to impose monetary damages before 
imposing cancellation of the lease.
97
 The statute of limitations for a breach 
of implied covenant claims in Texas is four years.
98
  
2. Oklahoma 
In Oklahoma, courts view implied covenants as a part of the contract 
under the oil and gas lease. Oklahoma recognizes the implied covenants to: 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Id.  
 92. See infra Part III–D.   
 93. Amoco, 622 S.W.2d at 567.  
 94. Id. at 567–68.  
 95. Sun Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Jackson, 783 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex. 1989); see also Atl. 
Richfield Co. v. Gruy, 720 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. App. 1986) (noting that “a prudent 
operator would not drill absent some evidence the drilling would be profitable”).   
 96. Hitzelberger v. Samedan Oil Corp., 948 S.W.2d 497, 506 (Tex. App. 1997). 
 97. Id.; see also Coastal Oil & Gas Corp v. Roberts, 28 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. App. 
2000) (noting that an oil and gas lease should be construed disfavoring forfeiture). 
 98. Amoco, 622 S.W.2d at 571.  
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(1) explore, (2) develop, (3) diligently and properly operate the lease, and 
(4) protect the lease from drainage.
99
 Oklahoma courts apply the prudent 
operator standard to determine if an implied covenant exists. Furthermore, 
in Oklahoma, a duty to develop does not exist where there is not a 
reasonable expectation of profits.
100
  
Lessors bringing claims for breach of an implied covenant may seek 
termination of the lease or to recover monetary damages.
101
 Oklahoma 
courts, however, generally require the lessor to send notice and demand of 
compliance with the implied covenant and provide the lessee with a 
reasonable opportunity to comply before granting a termination of the 
lease.
102
 Because Oklahoma courts recognize implied covenants as being a 
part of the contract, lessors must be aware of the five-year statute of 
limitations for breach of contract claims.
103
 
3. Kansas 
The Kansas legislature has given courts the authority to enforce implied 
covenants by passing the Kansas Deep Horizons Act.
104
 These statutes 
assist the courts in analyzing these implied covenants in an oil and gas 
lease. Section 55–223 states:  
As a matter of Kansas public policy, all oil and gas leases and 
subleases for the exploration, development and production of oil, 
gas or other minerals, or any combination thereof, which are 
held by production shall be presumed to contain, in addition to 
any expressed covenants therein, an implied covenant to 
reasonably explore and to develop the minerals which are the 
subject of such lease. Such implied covenant shall be a burden 
upon the lessee and any successor in interest.
105
 
Kansas courts, following the Brewster opinion, apply the prudent operator 
standard in evaluating implied covenants of an oil and gas lease. Like Texas 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Ramsey Petroleum Corp. v. Davis, 85 P.2d 427, 429 (Okla. 1938).  
 100. See Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638, P.2d 441, 449 (Okla. 1981) (noting that 
“the covenant for further development as it is interpreted in this jurisdiction while limiting 
the duty to drill additional wells to those instances where a prudent operator would expect a 
probability of potential profit from the well contemplated”).  
 101. See Rosamond, 120 P.2d 349 (Okla. 1941); Concorde Res. Corp. v. Kepco Energy, 
Inc., 254 P.3d 734 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011).   
 102. Concorde, 254 P.3d at 742.  
 103. Rosamond, 120 P.2d at 354.  
 104. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55–223 through 229 (West 2017).  
 105. Id. § 55–223.  
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and Oklahoma, Kansas courts recognize the lessee’s duty to develop, but 
allow the lessee to consider their reasonable expectation of profitability.
106
 
In failure-to-develop cases, the lessor has the burden of proving by 
“competent evidence” that the lessee breached the implied covenant.107 
Kansas courts may give a lessee, who breached an implied covenant, a 
reasonable time to comply. Termination or monetary damages may are also 
awarded at the determination of the courts.
108
 Kanas courts recognize that 
implied covenants are implied in fact, and therefore are a part of the 
contract.
109
 As such, a breach of an implied covenant in an oil and gas lease 
is subject to Kansas’s five-year statute of limitations for contracts.110  
4. New Mexico 
New Mexico courts recognize the implied covenant of reasonable 
development. In State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Worden,
111
 New 
Mexico acknowledged implied covenants in an oil and gas lease for the first 
time. The Supreme Court of New Mexico stated: 
There is an implied covenant on the part of the lessee (in the 
absence of any expressed on the subject as in this lease) that 
after production of oil and gas in paying quantities is obtained, 
he will thereafter continue the work of development for 
production of oil and gas with reasonable diligence as to the 
undeveloped portion of the leased land.
112
 
New Mexico also adopted the reasonably prudent operator standard. In 
Libby v. De Baca,
113
 the court held that a lessee must use “reasonable 
diligence, as viewed from the standpoint of a reasonably prudent operator,” 
while accounting for his interest and the interests of the lessor.
114
 
Breach of an implied covenant can result in the termination of the oil and 
gas lease; however, courts may provide the lessee time to comply with the 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See e.g., Rush v. King Oil Co., 556 P.2d 431, 435 (Kan. 1976) (“The large expense 
incident to exploration and development, combined with the additional fact the lessee must 
bear the loss of unsuccessful exploration and development, justifies the lessee in exercising 
caution with regard to his own economic interests, as well as the interests of the lessor.”).  
 107. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55–224 (West 2017).  
 108. Id. § 55–226.  
 109. See Smith v. Amoco Prod. Co., 31 P.3d 255, 268 (Kan. 2001). 
 110. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60–511(1) (West 2017). 
 111. 103 P.2d 124, 127 (N.M. 1940).  
 112. Id. at 126 (citations omitted). 
 113. 179 P.2d 263 (N.M. 1947).  
 114. Id. at 265. 
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obligations of the covenant.
115
 There is a six-year statute of limitations in 
New Mexico for written contracts,
116
 but the courts have yet to decide this 
issue with respect to implied covenants in an oil and gas lease.  
5. Colorado  
Colorado views implied covenants under four simple categories: (1) duty 
to drill, (2) duty to develop after discovery of oil and gas in paying 
quantities, (3) duty to operate diligently and prudently, and (4) duty to 
protect against drainage.
117
 The performance required to comply with an 
implied covenant is the prudent operator standard.  “Whether the lessee 
exercised the diligence proper under the circumstances to operate the lease 
is determined by whatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably 
expected of all operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the 
interests of both lessor and lessee.”118 Colorado courts, however, have held 
that “the implied covenant of reasonable development requires a 
determination that additional development will be profitable.”119 Thus, a 
lessee is allowed to take into account his reasonable expectation of profits 
when deciding whether to further develop.  
In Colorado, a lessor may bring a claim for termination of the lease if 
breach of an implied covenant has occurred, and the termination may be 
full or partial, depending on the circumstances of the breach.
120
 There is a 
three-year statute of limitations for breach of contract claims in Colorado.
121
 
6. Wyoming 
Wyoming law acknowledges implied covenants in oil and gas leases. 
The courts have established that oil and gas leases contain an implied 
covenant of development.
122
 The Supreme Court of Wyoming also follows 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. at 266 (“We will direct the trial court to modify its decree and deny cancellation 
of the interests of such defendants in the lease on the forty acre tract on which the paying 
well was completed in December, 1938, on the condition that they proceed with reasonable 
diligence to market the gas from the well . . . .”).  
 116. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37–1–3 (West 2017).  
 117. Davis v. Cramer, 837 P.2d 218, 222 (Colo. App. 1992) (citing Mountain States Oil 
Corp. v. Sandoval, 125 P.2d 964 (Colo. 1942)).  
 118. Davis, 837 P.2d at 222–23 (internal quotations omitted).  
 119. Gillette v. Pepper Tank Co., 694 P.2d 369, 372 (Colo. App. 1984); see also 
Whitham Farms, LLC v. City of Longmont, 97 P.3d 135, 137–38 (Colo. App. 2003).  
 120. Davis, 837 P.2d 218; Gillette, 694 P.2d 369; Whitham Farms, 97 P.3d 135. 
 121. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–80–101 (West 2017).  
 122. Sonat Expl. Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 710 P.2d 221, 225 (Wyo. 1985). 
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the prudent operator standard developed in Brewster.
123
 Additionally, in 
contemplating reasonable prudence, courts “consider whether further 
drilling would prove profitable, not only to the lessor but also to the 
lessee.”124 In other words, like other states, profitability is a critical factor in 
determining breach of implied covenants in Wyoming. Termination of the 
oil and gas lease is allowed for a breach of an implied covenant. While it is 
unclear how the statute of limitations would apply to a breach of an implied 
covenant in oil and gas leases, Wyoming has a ten-year statute of 
limitations for written contracts and an eight-year limit for unwritten 
contracts.
125
   
7. North Dakota 
In North Dakota, while the courts do recognize implied covenants in oil 
and gas leases, they have referred to the covenants “to reasonably develop” 
and “further exploration” together.126 With regard to the implied covenant 
of reasonable development, the Supreme Court of North Dakota stated: 
The law is well settled that the lessee in any oil and gas lease has 
an implied obligation to the lessor to do everything that a 
reasonably prudent operator should do in operating, developing 
and protecting the property with due consideration being given 
to the interests of both the lessor and lessee, if there is no express 
clause in the lease relieving the lessee of this implied duty.
127
 
Thus, North Dakota courts use the reasonably prudent operator standard in 
determining whether a lessee has breached an implied covenant of an oil 
and gas lease.
128
  
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has held that several factors are 
taken into consideration when applying the prudent operator standard to a 
lessee’s actions: 
(1) the quantity of oil and gas capable of being produced as 
indicated by prior exploration and development; (2) the local 
market and demand therefor; (3) the extent and results of the 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Id.; see also Phillips v. Hamilton, 95 P. 846 (Wyo. 1908).  
 124. Id. at 228.  
 125. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1–3–105(a) (West 1993).  
 126. Johnson, 392 N.W.2d at 57. 
 127. Feland v. Placid Oil Co., 171 N.W.2d 829, 835 (N.D. 1969). 
 128. See, e.g., Olsen v. Schwartz, 345 N.W.2d 33, 39 (N.D. 1984) (noting that “whether 
or not there has been reasonable development of a leasehold is determined by reference to 
the ‘prudent operator’ standard”). 
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operations, if any, on adjacent lands; (4) the character of the 
natural reservoir—whether such as to permit the drainage of a 
large area by each well; (5) the usages of the business; (6) the 
cost of drilling, equipment, and operation of wells; (7) the cost of 
transportation, storage, and the prevailing price; (8) general 
market conditions as influenced by supply and demand or by 
regulation of production through governmental agencies; (9) 
evidence of the willingness of another operator to drill on the 
tract in question; (10) the attitude of the lessee toward further 
development; and (11) the elapsed time since drilling operations 
were last conducted.
129
 
In North Dakota, the lessor has the burden of proving breach of an implied 
covenant. Furthermore, the “lessor alleging breach of implied covenants is 
not entitled to forfeiture of a lease until he has notified the lessee of the 
breach, demanded that the terms of the implied covenant be complied with 
within a reasonable time, and given the lessee a reasonable time for such 
compliance.”130 North Dakota contract law provides for a six-year statute of 
limitations for breach of contract claims.
131
 
8. Louisiana 
In Louisiana, the Louisiana Civil Code and the Louisiana Mineral Code 
provide the authority to enforce implied covenants. Section 122 of the 
Louisiana Mineral Code
132
 states:  
A mineral lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor, 
but he is bound to perform the contract in good faith and to 
develop and operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent 
operator for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor. Parties 
may stipulate what shall constitute reasonably prudent conduct 
on the part of the lessee.
133
 
Additionally, Article 2683 of the Louisiana Civil Code stipulates the lessee 
has the obligation of using “the thing as a prudent administrator and in 
accordance with the purpose for which it was leased.”134 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Johnson, 392 N.W.2d at 57–58.  
 130. Id. at 58 (citing Olsen, 345 N.W.2d at 40).  
 131. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28–01–16 (West 2017).  
 132. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:1 through 217 (West 2017). 
 133. Id. § 31:122. 
 134. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2683(2) (West 2017).  
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While the Mineral Code and the Civil Code do not define implied 
covenants into specific categories, the comment to Section 122 of the 
Louisiana Mineral Code does provide: 
In Louisiana, the general obligation to act as a “good 
administrator” or “prudent operator” has been clearly specified 
in four situations: (1) the obligation to develop known mineral 
producing formations in the manner of a reasonable, prudent 
operator; (2) the obligation to explore and test all portions of the 
leased premises after discovery of minerals in paying quantities 
in the manner of a reasonable, prudent operator; (3) the 
obligation to protect the leased property against drainage by 
wells located on neighboring property in the manner of a 
reasonable, prudent operator; and (4) the obligation to produce 
and market minerals discovered and capable of production in 
paying quantities in the manner of a reasonable, prudent 
operator.
135
  
Louisiana courts have held that a lessee has a duty to develop the 
producing formation in a manner of a reasonably prudent operator, taking 
into account his interests as well as the interests of the lessor.
136
 The 
Supreme Court of Louisiana held that reasonable development is a 
“question of fact which must be resolved by a consideration of the facts and 
circumstances shown in the particular case.”137 Louisiana courts have 
developed six factors to apply in determining whether a lessee has breached 
an implied covenant: (1) geological data, (2) number and location of wells 
drilled, (3) productive capacity of existing wells, (4) cost of drilling versus 
reasonably expected profit, (5) lapse of time between last well completed 
and demand for further operations, and (6) consideration of the acreage 
involved in the lease.
138
 Thus, Louisiana courts apply a fact specific 
analysis to determine whether a lessee has acted as a prudent operator in 
breach of implied covenant cases.  
Like other states, Louisiana requires the lessor to give notice and demand 
for default of compliance before claiming breach. By placing the lessee in 
                                                                                                                 
 135. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:122. 
 136. See generally Goodrich v. Exxon Co., USA, 608 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct. App. 1992); 
see also Carter v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 36 So. 2d 26, 28 (La. 1948) (noting that reasonable 
development by the lessee is what is expected of persons of ordinary prudence in similar 
circumstances, while having due regard for the interest of both parties).  
 137. Carter, 36 So. 2d at 26. 
 138. Goodrich, 608 So. 2d at 1023. 
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default, the lessor gives notice of the alleged breach of the implied 
covenant, and allows the lessee a reasonable opportunity to comply with the 
demand.
139
 The courts, however, have held that notice and demand of 
default letters that only demand release of the oil and gas lease, are 
insufficient to place the lessee in default.
140
 Failure to properly place the 
lessee in default can be raised as a defense to such a claim.  
In Louisiana, the lessor has the burden of proof in showing that a lessee 
has not acted as a reasonably prudent operator in performing his obligations 
under an implied covenant. If the lessor proves that “a mineral lease is 
violated, an aggrieved party is entitled to any appropriate relief provided by 
law.”141 Comment to Section 134 of the Louisiana Mineral Code provides:    
Although the remedy of specific performance has not been 
granted in Louisiana where the demand is for compliance with 
an obligation[] such as one to drill a well, the remedy can be 
appropriate, such as in the case of failure to pay royalties, if what 
the lessor desires is payment rather than some other remedy, or 
in the case of a lessee who seeks to have the lessor deliver the 
lease premises to him for his enjoyment.
142
 
Under Louisiana law, a claim for breach of implied covenant is subject to a 
ten-year statute of limitations for personal actions.
143
 
IV. Potential for Litigation 
As previously discussed, the implied covenants of an oil and gas lease 
have long been recognized as playing an important role in the obligations of 
the lessor-lessee relationship. While implied covenant law provides a 
foundation for resolving traditional controversies, the oil and gas industry 
continues to evolve with new technologies. One thing that is certain, is that 
there will continue to be unanticipated problems that arise from unforeseen 
developments not covered by the oil and gas lease. Thus, the law of implied 
covenants will continue to regulate the relationship between the lessor and 
lessee.   
With hydraulic fracturing playing an ever-expanding role in oil and gas 
production, the sand needed to perform this enhanced recovery method is 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Hunt v. Stacey, 632 So. 2d 872, 876 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1994).  
 140. Id.  
 141. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:134. 
 142. Id.  
 143. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3499 (West 2017). 
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becoming a growing commodity. As consumption of frac sand has grown, 
oil and gas operators realized that they must make plans to address their 
future needs. One recent development is in-basin sand, which is in 
abundance with a much lower cost of transportation.
144
 Much of the in-
basin sand, however, is inferior in quality to that of the Northern White 
sand once used for all hydraulic fracturing jobs. Potentially, the use of this 
in-basin sand will result in lower production results. With this in mind, the 
question raised from a legal perspective is whether an oil and gas operator 
should have a duty to use the highest quality frac sand available in respect 
to his obligations to the lessor. A few theories of potential litigation that 
could result will now be explored. 
A. Hypothetical Development and Drainage Issues 
1. Breach of Duty to Develop 
First, consider the following hypothetical: Texas-area operator finished 
drilling well and is preparing operations for hydraulic fracturing of the well. 
Operator, taking into account the recent downturn in the market, makes the 
decision to acquire frac sand for the operation from an in-basin sand mine 
in Texas. This sand is lower quality than that of the industry standard frac 
sand that have optimal qualities
145
 typically used to fracture a well, but at a 
significantly lower cost because the local sand is cheaper to transport than 
the higher quality sand.
146
 The lower-quality sand is used to fracture the 
                                                                                                                 
 144. See, e.g., North American FracSand Consumption Will Grow, supra note 13 (noting 
that there are over 24 million metric tons of sand resource untapped in central Texas alone).  
 145. The qualities that make the sand optimal are hardness, sphericity, and uniformity of 
size. Hardness is often referred to as “crush strength.” It is important because subsurface 
forces will attempt to close the fractures after the fracing fluid exits during flowback of the 
well. If the sand does not have the sufficient crush strength, some of the particles will be 
break apart under the subsurface force that is attempting the close the fracture. If the 
particles are crushed, they will not be as effective at propping open the fractures and the 
crushed particles may partially block the open spaces between the other particles. Because 
the oil and gas in the formation uses the spaces between the particles as pathways to flow 
into the wellbore, the partial blockage of those pathways can reduce production rates. 
Sphericity and uniformity of size are important because spherical particles that are uniform 
in size will pack together more neatly with more open space between particles—thus leaving 
more open space for fluid to flow—than particles of irregular size and shape.     
 146. See North American FracSand Consumption Will Grow, supra note 13 (Locally-
sourced frac sand, because of the lower cost of transportation, can reduce the cost to the 
operator by as much as 50%–80%).   
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well.
147
 The well begins producing in paying quantities but over time 
production rates decline, and the well is producing at a rate twenty percent 
less than other wells in the reservoir.   
The question arises whether the operator has breached his implied duty 
to develop. It could be argued that the operator has drilled the well and 
performed additional operations to enhance production, but he has not done 
so as the reasonable prudent operator would. While the operator is able to 
offset the lower production rates with the savings from the lower cost of the 
in-basin sand and still be profitable, the lessor does not share in those 
savings but incurs a twenty-percent reduction in royalties from the lower 
production rate. With this in mind, it could be argued that the operator has 
the freedom to drill the well and conduct operations accordingly because he 
bears the cost of development. Thus, it stands to reason that the operator 
would drill the well in the most cost-efficient manner possible, without 
jeopardizing the integrity of the well. The lessor, not sharing in the cost of 
the drilling or operations, is neutral because they are unaffected until the 
well starts producing. Here, however, even though the lessor does not share 
in the costs of fracing the well, their share of royalties from the production 
is directly affected by the operator’s decisions made during the fracing of 
the well.   
2. Breach of Duty to Protect Against Drainage 
Now, consider another hypothetical: Texas-area operator has, again, 
finished drilling well and is preparing operations for hydraulic fracturing of 
the well. Operator, taking into account the recent downturn in the market, 
decides to acquire frac sand for the operation from an in-basin sand mine in 
Texas. The lower-quality sand is used to fracture the well. The well begins 
producing in paying quantities but over time production rates decline, and 
the well is producing at a rate twenty percent less than other wells in the 
reservoir. Additionally, an adjacent well on the neighboring property, 
                                                                                                                 
 147. It should be noted that not all hydraulic fracturing jobs require high quality (Tier 1) 
frac sand. Lower quality sands are often used in shallow depth wells were high crush 
strength in not need because the subsurface forces are lower than at deeper depths. 
Additionally, other types of proppants might be used in hydraulic fracturing such as resin-
coated sand or manufactured ceramic particles. While these types of proppants are more 
crush resistant, they typically are more expensive than sand.    
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss6/5
2018] Frac Sand, Hydraulic Fracturing & Implied Covenants 1421 
 
 
fractured using industry standard frac sand, is causing drainage from the 
lessor’s leased property.148 
Here the question arises whether the operator has breached his duty to 
protect against drainage. One could argued that even though the operator 
has drilled the well and taken steps to enhance production, he has not done 
so as the reasonably prudent operator would. In this hypothetical, now not 
only is the lessor receiving a reduced share of royalties, there is permanent 
loss of oil and gas from under the leased property. Of course, the lessor 
must show that there is substantial drainage
149
 and in this circumstance the 
well has already been drilled. The lessee would likely argue that he 
complied with his duty and that the rule of capture
150
 should preclude his 
liability. Here again, the lessor’s share of royalties has been reduced not 
only by the lower rate of production, but quite possible, permanently by the 
drainage to the neighboring well as a direct result of the operator’s 
decisions during the fracing of the well.  
3. Breach of Duty to Protect Against “Fraudulent” Drainage 
Finally, consider a third hypothetical: Texas-area operator has, again, 
finished drilling well and is preparing operations for hydraulic fracturing of 
the well. Operator, taking into account the recent downturn in the market, 
decides to acquire frac sand for the operation from an in-basin sand mine in 
Texas. The lower-quality sand is used to fracture the well. The well begins 
producing in paying quantities but over time production rates decline, and 
the well is producing at a rate twenty percent less than other wells in the 
reservoir. Additionally, adjacent wells on the neighboring property that 
surround the lessor’s property, fractured using industry standard frac sand, 
are causing drainage from the lessor’s leased property. The adjacent wells 
are also leased and operated by the operator, who has a more favorable 
working interest, in regard to those wells, than provided for in the lease 
with the lessor of the well in subject.
151
 
                                                                                                                 
 148. For purposes of this hypothetical the proposed adjacent well was fractured using the 
industry standard for frac sand for effect, but in theory it is irrelevant as long as there is 
drainage from the lessor’s well to the adjacent well.  
 149. See supra notes 76–77. 
 150. See supra note 72. 
 151. For example, the lessee might have a seven-eighths working interest in the leases 
surrounding the property of lessor whose lease was being drained, while holding only a five-
eighths working interest in the property being drained. It would be to the advantage of the 
lessee to have more production on those properties with a seven-eighths working interest 
because he would receive a larger share of the production, free from royalties.    
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Here the question arises whether the operator has breached his duty to 
protect against drainage. One might argue that even though the operator 
drilled the well and took steps to enhance production, he has not done so as 
the reasonably prudent operator would. In this third hypothetical, now not 
only is the lessor receiving a reduced share of royalties and incurring a 
permanent loss of oil and gas from under the leased property, it appears the 
operator has potentially taken steps that could amount to “fraudulent 
drainage.”152 In this situation, the lessee would likely have an even more 
difficult argument of precluding liability by the rule of capture.
153
 Now, not 
only have the decisions of the lessee during the fracing of the well directly 
affected the lessor by reducing his share of royalties and drainage that 
resulted in a permanent loss of oil and gas, but it has directly affected the 
operator’s profitability.  
B. Hypothetical Obstacles in Litigation  
While each of these hypotheticals begins with the same basic premise, 
each brings in a different set of facts that change the dynamic such that each 
must be considered carefully. First, in each hypothetical situation, the 
operator’s decisions must be looked at from the prospective of the 
reasonably prudent operator standard.
154
 It should also be pointed out that in 
all of these situations, the question of whether to drill a well (i.e. duty to 
develop), or whether to drill an offset well (i.e. duty to protect against 
drainage), is not at issue. The issue in these situations is whether the 
operator acted reasonably prudent in the secondary recovery operations 
done during the hydraulic fracturing stage of the operations.  
In the first hypothetical, the lessor is perceivably receiving a reduced 
share of royalties because of the lower rate of production. One issue, here, 
is that the lessor would likely have to prove that the use of the lower-quality 
sand decreased the ultimate recovery of the oil and gas under the lease, not 
the rate of recovery.
155
 The operator would likely argue that the lessor has 
not been damaged because the oil and gas remained in the formation until 
produced over time. The operator could also argue that the well could be 
reworked or re-fracture by a subsequent hydraulic fracturing job. However, 
this raises another interesting point, should the lessor wish to have the well 
                                                                                                                 
 152. See supra note 79. 
 153. See supra note 72. 
 154. See infra Part III–B.  
 155. See Trimble v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 117 W.Va. 650, 654, 187 S.E. 331, 338 
(1936) (noting that there is no recognized principal by any court that would entitle a plaintiff 
to quickest possible rate of return from their well). 
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re-fractured the question becomes: whether the operator can take in to 
account his reasonable expectation of profits in re-fracturing the well. If the 
operator were allowed to take this into account, it could excuse his potential 
breach of duty for not properly fracing the well in the first place. Further, 
one might argue that once the well ceased to produce in paying quantities, 
the lease would terminate, and the lessor could enter into another lease to 
produce the remaining oil and gas. But, if it would not be profitable to the 
first operator, it stands to reason that a subsequent operator would not find 
it profitable to re-fracture the well, especially considering the well had now 
ceased production.  
Another potential obstacle is proof of the reduced rate of production. 
While evidence of production rates in a particular field is likely obtainable, 
there is a lot of unknown in the oil and gas industry. It might prove difficult 
to ascertain how much the type of sand used in the hydraulic fracturing of a 
particular well affected its production rates. Additionally, not every 
hydraulic fracturing job is the same, as the number of stages and amount of 
sand can vary greatly depending on the particular well.
156
 However, if it is 
ascertained that production has declined from the use of lower-quality sand 
compared with adjacent wells, then logically the lessor could argue that the 
operator failed to act as a reasonably prudent operator and breached his 
duty of reasonable development.  Additionally, it would likely prove that 
this affected the ultimate recovery and not merely the rate of recovery, as 
the lower-quality sand allowed the fractures to close and clog up the 
passageways for the oil and gas to flow out of the formation.  
In the second hypothetical, the lessor is not only perceivably receiving a 
reduced share of royalties because of the lower rate of production, but also 
there is permanent loss of oil and gas from under the leased property. In 
addition to the obstacles discussed in the first hypothetical, the issue here is 
that the lessor must show that there has been substantial drainage that 
resulted in permanent loss. The permanent loss may prove more difficult 
because the lessor is not dealing with the typical duty to protect against 
drainage, which usually involves the drilling of a protection well to protect 
the lease. Here, the theory is that the drainage from the lease stemmed from 
the use of lower-quality sand used in the hydraulic fracturing of the well, 
which in turn led to a lower rate of production. The lower-quality sand 
usage, therefore, led to oil and gas that was not recovered migrating outside 
of the lease and being recovered by adjacent wells. The most difficult part 
of proving this theory is connecting the dots to show the domino effect that 
                                                                                                                 
 156. See generally Schaefer, supra note 38.  
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eventually led to the drainage. Indeed, it may prove difficult to ascertain 
how much the lower-quality sand affected the rate of production, how much 
oil and gas was left in the formation, how much oil and gas was drained, 
and if that amount was substantial.  
In the third hypothetical, which is a very narrow and specific set of 
circumstances, not only is the lessor receiving a reduced share of royalties 
and incurring a permanent loss of oil and gas from under the leased 
property, but it appears the operator has taken steps that could amount to 
“fraudulent drainage.” Now, not only must the dots connect between the 
rate of production, how much oil and gas were left in the formation and 
drained by nearby wells, in addition, it must show that the operator’s 
operations were the cause of the drainage.  While substantial drainage must 
be shown, some courts place a lesser burden of proof on the lessor when the 
operator and not a third party is the cause of drainage.
157
 In addition, one or 
more of the elements generally required of the lessor is sometimes 
eliminated, or the usually available defenses to the operator is denied.
158
 
Here, while the difficulties of the second hypothetical remain, given the 
facts that the lessee caused the drainage on adjacent leases where the lessee 
had a more favorable working interest, it is perceivable that a lessor would 
have a strong suit, especially given the courts’ attitude towards fraudulent 
drainage cases.  
In all of the hypotheticals, the first and perhaps biggest obstacle is 
proving that the operator has not acted as a reasonably prudent operator.
159
 
This obstacle may be difficult to overcome if several operators are also 
using in-basin sand because one could argue that it is an accepted practice 
within the industry. Further, operators may argue that they are responding 
to the market and its economics because the cost, logistics, and 
transportation of frac sand from the northern Midwest has proven difficult. 
Based on the large amounts of sand being consumed on a year to year basis 
alone,
160
 has arguably made it necessary for operators to look for 
alternatives. Keep in mind, however, the reasonably prudent operator 
standard requires “[w]hatever, in the circumstances, would be reasonably 
expected of operators of ordinary prudence, having regard to the interests of 
both lessor and lessee, is what is required.”161  
                                                                                                                 
 157. WILLIAMS & MYERS, supra note 72, § 824.  
 158. Id.; see also supra note 80.  
 159. See supra note 72.  
 160. See supra note 24. 
 161. Brewster, 140 F. at 814. 
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 Finally, it should be pointed out that these hypotheticals are merely that, 
hypothetical. It is purely speculation as to how the courts would come down 
on these issues. But, what is important, is to keep in mind that the oil and 
gas industry will continue to evolve, and new technologies will continue to 
develop. As it does, the traditional notions of implied covenants to the oil 
and gas lease should evolve with it because new technologies bring about 
new problems. One being that Operators are usually in a much better 
position to understand the complexities. Courts should avoid rigid 
interpretation of the implied covenants to protect the lessors and royalty 
interest owners that are less knowledgeable. Thus, operators should have 
the freedom to innovate and become more efficient; it just should not be at 
the expense of the lessors and royalty interest owners.    
 V. Conclusion  
Oil and gas operators must continue to be cognizant, not only of the 
bottom line but also of lessors and the obligations owed to them. The law of 
implied covenants helps to regulate the relationship between operators and 
lessors, but these laws must be able to adapt as new issues arise out of this 
relationship. New sources of frac sand while economically beneficial to the 
operator in the short term, could potentially have unintended consequences 
for lessors and operators in the long term. Operators should further consider 
the effects of using in-basin sand, how it could harm production rates, how 
that could harm them financially, how that could harm lessors and royalty 
interest owners, and how it could lead to potential litigation. One must 
remember, sometimes efficiency is not always efficient. As Robert Herrick 
wrote, “‘Tis haste Makes waste.” 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
